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Marginal Opportunity Cost Pricing for 
Municipal Water Supply 
by Jeremy J. Warford 
Abstract 
This paper describes the general rationale for marginal opportunity cost (MOC) pricing, 
illustrating the concept with special reference to municipal water supply. The various elements 
of MOC for water, namely marginal production or private cost (MPC); marginal user or 
depletion cost (MUC); and marginal environmental or external cost (MEC) are described and 
some numerical examples provided. The relevance of border prices in determining the MOC of 
tradeable commodities is also considered. The paper then reviews some of the key issues 
involved in actual implementation of MOC pricing. These include the treatment of externalities, 
measurement, financial and fiscal, income distributional and second best matters. The paper 
concludes by listing some possible research topics relating to MOC pricing. While the focus of 
the paper is on estimation and implementation of MOC as applied to municipal water supply, the 
approach and techniques employed are of general relevance. Other resources, such as coal and 
forests are referred to when they provide better illustration of some of the generic issues covered 
in the paper. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Economic Efficiency and Marginal Cost Pricing 
An important benchmark by which pricing policies may be judged is the contribution those 
policies make toward economic efficiency. An efficient policy may be defined roughly as one 
which maximizes the net benefits accruing to a community from a given course of action, with 
no consideration paid to the way in which those benefits are distributed. A proposition stemming 
from this definition is that the price of any service or commodity should be equated to the cost 
of producing an additional unit of it, or in other words, to its marginal or incremental cost. If 
consumers are willing to pay a price that exceeds marginal cost, it means that they place a value 
on the marginal unit consumed at least as great as the cost to the rest of society of producing that 
unit, and output and consumption should therefore be expanded when system capacity is 
reached. If, on the other hand, the market clearing price is less than marginal cost, it can be 
assumed that there is oversupply of the commodity, the cost of additional output exceeding the 
benefits. 
Whether or not a policy is thought to contribute toward efficiency will depend upon the 
community whose benefits the analyst is interested in maximizing. Having determined the 
relevant target group of people, the marginal cost calculation requires a distinction to be made 
between purely financial or accounting costs, and the real (or economic) costs incurred by that 
group. The former costs, which might include repayment of past loans, simply represent a 
transfer of income within the community. Efficiency in resource allocation dictates that these 
Ak.Gt.1,) 
1 of 21 .F. 1 2003-01-22 2:24 PM 
Marginal Opportunity Cost Pricing for Municipal Water Supply http://idrinfo.idre.ca/archive/corpdocs/118129/Marginal.htm 
"sunk costs" be ignored for pricing purposes, for they represent no net loss, or avoidable cost, to 
society as a whole. On the other hand, the resources employed in the construction and operation 
of a particular project represent, at the time of employment, real costs in terms of opportunities 
forgone elsewhere. Similarly, adjustments to financial data need to be made where general price 
distortions exist. Where necessary, shadow prices representing the true economic cost of 
resources employed should be used for labour, foreign exchange, and capital, and adjustment 
made for transfer items, such as indirect taxes and subsidies. 
In a perfectly functioning market system, prices would approximate marginal cost. In practice, 
market distortions frequently require explicit government intervention, which may take the form 
of public operation or regulation of services such as water supply, or interventions to remedy the 
consequences of market failure, such as the use of pollution taxes or regulations. As noted, in 
such circumstances, marginal costs should be estimated and used as a basis for pricing in order 
to encourage efficient use of the commodity or service concerned. In practice however, whereas 
market failure may indicate the need for compensatory action on the part of government, the 
reverse often occurs. Governments frequently provide incentives which encourage 
environmentally damaging behavior; thus, water and energy subsidies are commonly 
encountered, particularly in developing countries. The perception that water is a "free good" is 
commonplace, but as municipal managers throughout the world know only too well, this is far 
from the case. In fact, water supply pricing illustrates the kind of policy reform that satisfies 
both environmental and economic criteria, the rationale for improved water pricing and the 
impediments to reform being of generic relevance in considering the use of economic 
instruments in environmental management. 
Investment in Water Supply: the Traditional Approach 
Pricing and investment decisions in the real world often diverge sharply from the marginal cost 
pricing ideal, and this is clearly illustrated with respect to municipal water supply, as well as for 
other services such as electric power or highway systems that are traditionally provided - or 
regulated - by the public sector. When faced with actual or impending water shortages, water 
authorities throughout the world tend to estimate future "requirements", typically by 
extrapolating past trends in consumption, adjusted for expected increases in population and 
industrial growth. The objective then is to attempt to meet the targeted consumption at least 
financial cost to the utility. The question of comparing benefits of projected consumption growth 
with the cost of incremental supply rarely arises. Indeed, benefit-cost estimation, in which an 
analyst attempts to impute the value of water in a wide array of different uses, is fraught with 
difficulty. In practice, the only way in which a reasonable assessment of the desirability of a 
particular rate of increase in water consumption can be made is by actual observation of 
consumers willingness to pay. 
Pricing of water, as of other resources, is therefore not simply a matter of raising revenues to 
ensure the continued operation of the enterprise concerned, although this is of course a major 
function of pricing. What concerns us here is the role of pricing in ensuring that the expansion of 
capacity and consumption is at the correct level. The pricing approach in effect places the 
burden on the consumer to reveal willingness to pay - and therefore value - of water consumed. 
If the price paid is at least equal to the costs of providing additional supplies, investment in 
additional capacity is warranted; if not, existing capacity should be rationed. To illustrate, it 
would be desirable if an industrial consumer based a decision to invest in recycling equipment 
by comparing the cost thereby incurred with the cost to society of investing in additional water 
supply capacity. Clearly, this will only be done if the water price faced by the industrial 
enterprise actually equals the cost to the water utility of expanding output. Incremental or 
marginal costs, rather than historic or sunk costs are therefore relevant for investment decision 
making. This forward-looking approach to pricing can provide a rigorous test of project 
justification if various other conditions are met with regard to the functioning of the market 
mechanism in general. 
Ideally, the price charged for water should equal its economic and environmental costs of 
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supply, plus the cost of disposing of wastewater, and should therefore vary from location to 
location, and sometimes according to time of use. Where actual shortages occur, prices should 
be even higher than actual system cost, at a level sufficient to ration existing capacity. Where 
private abstraction of water depletes existing sources, necessitating additional investment either 
by other firms or public water authorities, a similar charging principle should be used. 
While there are a number of complications, there is clearly considerable scope for water pricing 
reform in most countries. While some will gain and others lose from such reform, adjustment of 
tariff structures can protect deserving cases. However, from a societal point of view, price 
reform can be expected to be a "win win" policy, in which various economic and social 
objectives can be satisfied. Studies done in industrial and developing countries suggest that 
water price increases have a significant impact upon water consumption, reducing wasteful and 
inefficient use and costs of supply, and improving resource allocation. Such a policy will also 
raise revenues and be environmentally benign. 
The Concept of MOC 
We now look more closely at the concept of marginal cost, and define it more specifically as 
marginal opportunity cost (MOC), which emphasizes that costs of consuming resources should 
ideally be looked at in light of the opportunities foregone by that consumption. In fact, MOC 
may usefully be defined to include a number of distinct elements. Specifically, for non-tradeable 
goods or services: 
MOC = MPC + MUC + MEC 
where: 
MPC is the marginal production (or private) cost, 
MUC is the marginal user (or depletion) cost, and 
MEC is the marginal environmental (or external) cost. 
Marginal Production Cost. This includes the costs of production directly incurred by the 
agency concerned. In the case of water supply, MPC consists of those investment and operating 
costs that are a function of water consumption. These would include the cost of dams, river 
intakes, transmission mains and treatment works, and some distribution costs. Overheads 
including meter reading and maintenance unrelated to actual consumption would not be 
included. As in the case of the other elements of MOC, costs should be defined in economic 
terms; in other words, overall costs to society as a whole should be used, rather than just those 
incurred by the enterprise. The financial costs of the enterprise should therefore be adjusted to 
compensate for general market distortions, with shadow pricing being used as necessary. 
Production costs should also be adjusted if inputs (labor, capital or energy) used are subsidized 
by the government. To obtain the true production cost we must add an amount equal to the 
subsidy. If taxes are included in private production cost they should be deducted since they do 
not represent a real cost, but only a transfer item.). 
Marginal User Cost. Consumption of non-renewable resources may eventually require a 
substitute to be found for them at some future date. The cost of future use foregone is known as 
the user cost, or depletion premium. In practice, estimation of MUC may often be difficult, as it 
may involve prediction of costs of depletion or of substitutes many years hence. It will be shown 
below that there is sometimes some ambiguity in definitions: in certain cases, MUC is 
conceptually very similar to MPC. The distinction is however required when irreversible effects 
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take place; even when they do not, the distinction is useful for pricing purposes. Note that 
depletion costs exist because of market imperfections. If property rights are clearly defined and 
if social and private discount rates coincide, MUC will be included in MPC. 
Marginal Environmental Cost. Environmental costs, or externalities may arise at the 
production stage (MEC1) and/or consumption stage(MEC2), and may be positive or negative. 
For example, dam construction might damage local eco-systems, but may also result in flood 
control benefits. Water consumption might yield health benefits, not simply to the actual users, 
but also to others. On the other hand, discharge of wastewater creates negative externalities. 
Note that to the extent that some portion of environmental damages are recovered by 
government, for example by pollution taxes or regulatory mechanisms, MEC will already be 
incorporated in MPC. The presence of market failure, which gives rise to the need to estimate 
the present worth of environmental damage in the first place, is itself a reason why innovative 
methods must often be devised to impute reasonable values for MEC. 
Private abstraction. Many industrial water consumers and farmers abstract water privately, 
using their own tubewells. In principle, they should be charged a price that covers the marginal 
costs of depletion to their neighbors, or the marginal capacity cost to the public authority, plus 
any environmental damage caused by the discharge of wastewater. 
Tradeables. Where the resource concerned (such as coal or timber, or in rare instances, water) is 
tradeable in international markets, MOC may be defined more broadly as follows: 
MOC = (MPC + MUC + MEC) or the border price, whichever is the greater 
For example, as long as the marginal cost of producing the resource domestically (MPC + MUC 
+ MEC1) is less than the f.o.b. export price, the resource should be used to satisfy domestic 
demand (at the border price), and any surplus exported. Domestic prices should equal the export 
price (adjusted for the difference between the domestic transportation cost of exports and 
transportation cost related to domestic consumption), because the true cost (opportunity cost) of 
domestic consumption is the amount that a foreign buyer would be willing to pay for it. In 
addition, domestic consumers should bear the costs of any consumption externalities (MEC2). 
This may be achieved by several means, including specific charges or regulatory instruments for 
the emission of wastes into the air, waterways or sewers. Somewhat blunter instruments, such as 
inclusion of expected MEC2 in the price of the resource concerned can also be used. Examples 
include incorporation of the costs of sewage collection, treatment and disposal in water prices; 
and the costs of expected damage caused by SO2 emissions in the prices of various qualities of 
coal. 
Output quantities for which (MPC + MUC + MEC1) is greater than the c.i.f. import price should 
not be produced domestically at all, but imported instead. If for some reason the government 
does not wish to be dependent upon a foreign supplier, and insists upon domestic production, the 
local price should in this case be (MPC + MUC + MEC1) plus some means of assigning 
responsibility for MEC2, as outlined in the previous paragraph. As a long term policy, domestic 
production for which MOC is greater than c.i.f. import prices is untenable under free trade 
conditions; it can only be effected through production subsidies or import tariffs which 
reintroduce a wedge between private and social opportunity costs. 
Application of MOC pricing as described above is in practice confronted by a number of 
problems. First of all, a number of conceptual and issues arise in the estimation of MOC. Actual 
implementation also faces a series of conceptual and practical obstacles. The remainder of this 
paper now addresses these two sets of issues. 
B. ESTIMATING MOC 
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Marginal Production Cost 
Capital Indivisibility: AIC Pricing. A distinction must be made between those costs that are a 
function of consumption and those that are not. Ambiguity in the definition of marginal cost 
arises where capital indivisibility (or "lumpiness") is present, for, with respect to water supply 
capacity and consumption, costs will be marginal at some times and non-marginal at others. For 
example, if the safe yield of a reservoir is less than fully utilized, the only costs immediately 
attributable to additional consumption are certain additional operating and maintenance costs. 
These represent short-run marginal costs. Long-run marginal costs, on the other hand, refer to 
the sum of short-run marginal costs and marginal capacity costs, the latter are defined as the 
costs of expanding capacity -- for example, building a new reservoir -- to accommodate an 
additional unit of consumption. 
The two definitions of marginal cost, one applicable in the short run and the other in the long 
run, have to be reconciled, for a pricing policy which is associated with an optimum use of 
existing capacity will frequently not be one which results in optimal decisions. Strictly 
interpreted, the marginal cost pricing rule requires that price should equal short-run marginal 
cost when capacity is less than fully utilized, but if demand increases so that existing capacity 
becomes fully utilized, price should be raised to ration existing capacity. This procedure should 
continue up to the point where consumers reveal their willingness to pay a price equal to 
short-run marginal cost plus the annual equivalent of marginal capacity cost. At this stage, that 
is, where price equals annual equivalent long-run marginal cost, investment in capacity 
expansion is justified. Once the investment has been carried out, however, price should fall 
again to short-run marginal cost, for the only real costs (or opportunity costs, in terms of 
alternative benefits forgone) are then operating costs. Price, therefore, plays the roles of (a) 
obtaining efficient utilization of resources when operating at less than full capacity, and (b) 
providing a signal to invest in additional system capacity. 






In this diagram, initial demand 
curve is D1, and existing supply costs (with capacity OA) are represented by short run marginal 
cost curve SMC1. As demand increases to D2, price should be raised to ration existing capacity 
OA up to the point where consumers reveal their willingness to pay a price that will cover long 
run marginal costs (LMC, which consists of short run costs plus the annual equivalent of 
marginal capacity costs). At this point (P2) investment should be carried out, increasing capacity 
to OB. However, since there is now excess capacity, marginal costs are again just the operating 
costs, in which case price should fall sharply to P3. As demand increases, 
price should again be raised until it equals LMC, thus providing the signal for further 
investment, and so on. 
Problems associated with strict marginal cost pricing, as just described, are therefore particularly 
apparent in the presence of capital indivisibility. This characteristic is however typical of water 
supply projects, where productive capacity is often installed to meet demands for a number of 
years hence. Initial costs of constructing reservoirs and laying connecting mains are usually very 
high in relation to operating and maintenance costs. Strict marginal cost pricing in these 
circumstances would entail significant fluctuations in price, a source of considerable uncertainty 
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for consumers, which would create particular problems for planning long-term investment in 
facilities complementary to, or competitive with, water consumption. Exploitation of 
groundwater -- the primary source for rural systems -- often gives rise to less difficulty in this 
respect; in the economist's jargon, the long-run marginal costs curve is frequently relatively 
"smooth". Even where it is technologically possible to extend capacity in small increments, 
however, fluctuations in the availability of finance often mean that capacity is extended in large 
lumps. This issue is particularly important in developing countries, where large backlogs in 
supply may be remedied and excess capacity created at the same time. 
One solution -- necessarily an imperfect one -- to the problem of capital indivisibility is to define 
marginal cost more broadly, and to set price equal to the average unit cost of incremental output. 
Average incremental costs can be calculated by dividing the discounted value of future supply 
costs by the (similarly discounted) amount of additional water to be produced. In practice, any 
version of marginal cost pricing has to be approximate, and ultimately some averaging of costs 
over a range of output is always required. Average incremental costs pricing will be theoretically 
less desirable the greater the degree of capital indivisibility, for while capacity remains idle, 
price will be in excess of the currently relevant marginal cost. However, in view of the 
difficulties inherent in any system requiring fluctuating prices, this method appears to be the 
best practicable approximation to optimal pricing that can be achieved in the water supply field; 
it also provides a relevant signal about cost trends to those who contemplate long term 
investment in equipment that is complementary to or a substitute for water use. Estimation of 
future engineering costs over a time horizon of 20-25 years is generally required. Since it is rare 
that expansion of water supply capacity involves a series of technically similar investments 
(cities bordering major rivers such as the Yangtze are an exceptional case), the use of 
statistically determined production functions to estimate costs on the basis of time series or cross 
sectional analysis is rarely appropriate. 
AIC is estimated by dividing the discounted incremental costs of meeting future demand by the 
corresponding discounted volume of incremental output over the same period. The numerator in 
the AIC formula is the present value of the least-cost investment stream plus the incremental 
operating and maintenance costs. The time stream of investment and operating costs in the 
numerator corresponds to the production stream over time in the denominator. The AIC formula 
is therefore: 
T (It+Gt t 
1 
ATC 
T '; - 44)l t r) i1 
(1) 
where It is the investment cost incurred in year t, o is the base year, Rt - Ro is the operating and 
maintenance cost incurred in year t due to incremental consumption, Qt - Qo is the incremental 
consumption in year t, and r is the discount rate. 
Increasing unit costs. Increasing unit costs of water tends to be the rule, as sources close to 
urban areas become fully utilized or polluted. This also applies to a number of other natural 
resources, where technological improvement and economies of scale are not sufficient to offset 
other forces. For example, in the case of forest operations, the cost of cutting and transporting a 
cubic meter (cu m) of timber does not remain constant regardless of the total amount of timber 
production. The more timber that is produced each year, the higher cost of producing an 
additional cu in of timber, because of limiting factors such as the use of less experienced logging 
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crew, overstretched management, transportation bottlenecks and the need to exploit increasingly 
more remote, or steeper forest sites. A similar set of considerations typically applies to the 
exploitation of coal reserves of a given quality. 
Distribution Networks. Capital indivisibility is demonstrated in an extreme form by both water 
supply distribution networks and by sewerage systems. Prior to construction, expansion of such 
systems is, by definition, a marginal cost and function of the expected consumption of those 
benefiting from it. These systems are however normally designed to meet demands placed upon 
them for many years hence, during which time additional consumption by existing consumers is 
responsible for negligible additional distribution capacity costs. The pure marginalist approach 
would suggest that the price charged for these services should also be negligible. They have to 
be financed somehow, though, and this may result in conflict often between economics, social, 
and financial objectives. 
Temporal and Locational Variations in Costs. The marginal cost pricing principle implies 
that price should reflect variations in the cost of supplying water to different types of consumer. 
It may therefore be desirable to distinguish between consumption at different times and at 
different locations. In the case of water supply, the cost of consumption may sometimes be 
expected to vary seasonally. If so, whether pressure on capacity is due to demand peaks or 
supply troughs or both, there may be a case for varying the price of water to achieve an efficient 
allocation of supplies. In some cases, such as abstraction from rivers or groundwater, marginal 
capacity costs (of pumping equipment, transmission mains etc) can be allocated to peak 
consumption, with marginal operating costs, which may vary seasonally, being allocated to all 
consumption. Where storage in reservoirs is involved, off-peak consumption, by drawing down 
the level of a reservoir, might also impose marginal capacity costs. Estimation of the appropriate 
peak and off-peak pricing policy therefore depends very much upon the type of water system 
involved, but in strict efficiency terms, such a distinction will frequently be justified. In practice, 
it would only be possible to introduce differential pricing for seasonal peaks: the need to meet 
diurnal peaks is reflected in the design of distribution systems, and differential pricing here 
would, prima facie, be too expensive to administer. 
Geographical variations in marginal costs should also be reflected in pricing policy. The use of 
national or state-wide uniform tariffs, which in developing countries is fairly widespread and 
seems to be growing, is clearly at odds with the principle, and may be responsible for inefficient 
locational decisions, particularly by large water-using industry. Occasionally, there may also be 
scope for distinguishing between consumers within a given urban area: connection and 
distribution costs may vary with population density, while consumption costs (pumping, etc.) 
may vary according to terrain. 
A number of political and social difficulties arise in attempting to ensure that temporal and 
locational variations in costs are reflected in pricing policy. In many cases, because the "need" 
for water is more apparent during the dry season, it is particularly difficult to levy a surcharge on 
consumption at that time. Regarding geographical cost variations, one explanation for the 
increasing pressure for uniformity is the improvement in communication which allows people in 
various parts of the country to know what is going on elsewhere. Failure to allow prices to 
reflect regional variations in costs on the grounds that this is equitable may have perverse 
effects, one of which might possibly be that poor consumers in low cost areas in effect subsidize 
high income consumers in high cost areas. 
Regional variations in supply costs are substantial in many countries. In China, the south tends 
to have abundant water resources, while the north has shortages. Expensive schemes are 
proposed to transfer water from south to north, including plans to transfer water from the 
Yangtze basin to Beijing. Improved pricing for water supply in the Beijing area is an urgent 
issue, and one which can yield tangible and substantial economic gains. In particular, long term 
benefits would take the form of a more rational geographical distribution of large water-using 
industry. 
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Marginal User Cost 
The concept of MUC can be explained most simply where a non-renewable resource is involved. 
Since it is fixed in supply, continued exploitation into the indefinite future is not possible; 
exhaustion of the resource will eventually occur. Consequently, using one unit of the resource 
now means that it will be unavailable at some future date. The seriousness (or cost) of 
consumption now will obviously depend upon the size of the stock; the rate of exploitation; the 
cost and availability of substitutes at some future date (including, for tradeables, world prices for 
an import substitute); and the rate of discount. Substitution might be achieved by imports or by 
using a replacement "backstop technology". 
The cost of future use foregone is known as the user cost or depletion premium, and may be 
estimated as the present worth of the cost of replacing the depleted asset at some future date. The 
user cost is therefore the difference between (a) the present worth of the marginal production 
costs of the replacement technology, or of the costs of imports, and (b) the present worth of the 
marginal production costs of the existing technology i.e: 
MUC = (Pb - C)/(1 + r)T 
where Pb is the price of the replacement technology (or of imports), C is marginal cost of 
extraction, harvesting, or marginal production costs of existing technology, r is the discount rate, 
and T is the time at which the replacement technology comes in, or when imports are required. 
Major uncertainties may arise in the estimation of MUC; in particular, the availability and cost 
of backstop technology may be very difficult to predict. However, while problems of prediction 
increase with time, they also become less important for the MUC estimation. MUC will be 
smaller, the greater the stock, the lower the rate of exploitation, and the longer the time horizon 
prior to exhaustion of the resource. For example, in China, which has abundant coal reserves, the 
MUC of consuming coal at the present time is insignificant; on the other hand, exploitation of its 
few remaining tropical forest areas would appear to have a relatively high MUC. Note also the 
role of the discount rate; other things equal, the higher the rate, the lower the MUC. 
The foregoing describes the simplest case to illustrate the MUC concept; particular 
complications arise with regard to the treatment of resources that are in principle renewable, but 
in practice, due to overuse, may not be. The sensitivity of the results to slight changes in 
assumptions about exponential variables combined with uncertainty about the future indicate 
that the MUC calculation should be regularly updated if the concept is to be useful. 
It should also be noted that in certain circumstances, MUC may already be included in MPC. 
This might apply where there are competitive markets, implying a clear definition of property 
rights, and a coincidence between social and private discount rates. However, these conditions 
are rarely encountered, particularly as they relate to the ownership and rights to exploit natural 
resources such as forests, coal, and water in most developing countries. 
With further regard to the relationship between MPC and MUC, let us assume that depletion 
takes place in year T. The depletion premium is defined as the additional cost over and above 
the cost of production from existing sources (incurred because of the more expensive backstop 
technology or imports), also discounted to present worth from year T. MPC+MUC may be 
defined as the sum of the discounted value of the cost of operating existing sources (or the AIC 
of these) plus the discounted value of the depletion premium (or its AIC). Since MUC represents 
the difference between the cost of existing technology (MPC) and that of the backstop 
technology, MPC can be calculated simply by inserting the new technology in the cost stream; 
indeed, there is some ambiguity in determining at what stage an increment in supply actually 
represents a backstop technology. This is particularly difficult in the case of water supply, where 
technology is continually changing, for example as sources further and further from the point of 
consumption are exploited, and as unit costs are rising. Fortunately, the ambiguity does not pose 
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a serious problem; in estimating MOC it does not matter whether MPC is defined to include the 
full cost of backstop technology or whether the additional costs are separately designated as 
MUC. 
It might therefore be asked why it is necessary to separately identify the MUC component. A 
difference between the social discount rate and the discount rate of the utility manager would be 
sufficient reason. In practice the distinction is useful in highlighting those cases in which 
resources are in danger of depletion and in which strategic decisions need to be made regarding 
substitute technology or imports. Moreover, depletion costs due to incremental consumption 
may be higher at some times than at others; the concept of MUC may therefore be relevant for 
the design of tariff structures, particularly where seasonal differentiation in pricing may be 
warranted. A further reason for the distinction between MPC and MUC is that the latter may call 
for different analytical skills, particularly when irreversible effects are involved. 
Marginal Environmental Cost 
In estimating MEC, a distinction should be made between those environmental externalities that 
are associated with the production of water, and those associated with actual consumption. 
These may be positive or negative. For example, the construction of a dam may involve 
damages to the local eco-system, threaten endangered species, or force human beings to abandon 
their homes, but may, on the other hand, have flood control benefits. This element of MEC may 
be labelled MEC1. Consumption of water may also involve external or environmental effects; 
health benefits might result not only to actual consumers, but also to their neighbors or 
associates. Estimates of health impacts require epidemiological analysis, followed by valuation 
in economic terms. 
Further, consumption of water involves disposal costs. Where sewers exist, or are planned, AIC 
can also be used, on the assumption that such expenditures are in fact economically justified. 
Where sewerage does not exist, there is no escape from some estimation of MEC, which again 
requires estimation of the epidemiological impact and quantification of that effect in economic 
terms. While MEC1 may be the same for all consumers, the environmental consequences of 
actual consumption, (MEC2) may be expected to vary according to the type of use. The quality 
of industrial wastewater, for example, can be expected to vary considerably among types of 
industry, and generally be more hazardous that household discharges. Optimal pricing would 
clearly distinguish between MEC1 and MEC2. While clearly relevant for water supply, this 
distinction is perhaps even more important in the case of certain other resources, such as coal. 
As in the case of MPC and MUC, the MEC calculation also involves a time dimension, as it 
refers to the present worth of incremental environmental or other external damage costs. MEC 
could be included in MPC where marginal damage costs are internalized, e.g. where industry is 
charged for pollution emissions according to the marginal damage costs created. However, in 
practice, MEC1 is generally far greater than the environmental costs incurred by polluters. (The 
distinction between production and consumption externalities is particularly important in the 
case of coal, where damage created by actual mining operations (subsidence, water and soil 
pollution) is very different to that occasioned by final consumption, where air pollution is the 
primary concern.) Whether or not environmental damage is actually internalized in this way, or 
by blunter instruments, such as incorporation of environmental cost (MEC) in water or 
electricity prices, valuation techniques are required. 
In principle, the range of valuation techniques that economists have developed may be relevant 
for water supply pricing. Market value approaches offer the best prospects where 
"dose-response" relationships can be established. These include the health impact of water 
pollution, and the damage to crops resulting from water resource development projects. Most of 
the skills required are those involved in establishing these physical relationships, such as 
epidemiologists and ecologists. Household production function approaches may also be used: 
estimation of avertive expenditures, such as expenditure on water filters may provide some 
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indication of willingness to pay for improved water quality; travel cost methods have also been 
used to assess the value of recreational areas, which may be positively or negatively influenced 
by water supply projects. Hedonic pricing methods have also been used; these include the 
impact of water supply and sewerage projects on property values, and the estimation of the 
impact of environmental factors on wage rates. Currently much effort is devoted to contingent 
valuation methods, in which surveys are used to assess the value of environmental change. 
The MOC Calculation: An Illustrative Example 
Numerical examples of the MOC calculation, in which the AIC formula is used to determine the 
cost per cu in of water, are presented in Tables 1 and 2. Cost and consumption data are 
discounted back to 1994, and all estimates are presented as values as of that date. While costs 
are presented in terms of $ per cu in., they do not purport to relate to the currency of any 
particular country. A 5% discount rate is used throughout. Table 1 includes estimates of the 
costs of supplying water over the 1994-2015 period, using conventional technology, such as 
pumping water from an underground source. The data show consumption growing up to the year 
2010 and then stabilizing, due to the exhaustion of available capacity. This is an unrealistic 
assumption in normal circumstances, but if it did materialize, the AIC of production (MPC), 
calculated in 1994 would be $2.50 per cu in. MEC is shown to be $2.00, and total MOC is 
therefore $4.50. As an example of how these calculations are done, AIC (production costs only) 
is estimated by summing the present worth equivalent of each annual cost in Column (4) and 
then dividing this amount by the sum of the present worth equivalent of each annual amount of 
consumption shown in Column (7). 
It should however be noted that if actual consumption stabilizes due to capacity constraints, 
while demand continues to increase, the opportunity cost of consuming water (in terms of 
amount other consumers would have paid for it) increases. In fact the MOC pricing rule requires 
that prices should equal either the cost of consuming incremental amounts, or the market 
clearing price, whichever is greater. Clearly, therefore, the $4.50 price in these circumstances 
would understate true MOC by an amount that would depend on how high the price would 
ideally be bid up when existing capacity becomes fully utilized. (Similarly, the opportunity cost 
of municipal water supply may be its highest value in different uses altogether, such as 
agriculture or direct abstraction by industry.) When existing sources of water are fully utilized, 
MUC would be the price necessary to ration capacity, minus MPC. Investment in backstop 
technology would be signalled when consumers reveal their willingness to pay a price over and 
above marginal production costs sufficient to cover the additional costs of backstop technology. 
MEC in this example does not explicitly distinguish between environmental costs associated 
with exploitation of water sources (MEC1) and those associated with wastewater disposal costs 
(MEC2). As noted earlier, the latter could refer either to the external environmental damage 
caused by the discharge of wastewater into neighborhoods or rivers, or could refer to the 
wastewater disposal costs actually incurred by municipal authorities in the form of sewerage and 
sewage treatment works. In principle, the cost of these investments, also characterized by capital 
indivisibility, could be handled similarly to water supply, but for simplicity annual costs with a 
linear relationship to water consumption are assumed in the example. 
Table 2 then presents estimates of MOC in cases (a) where a new "backstop" technology (such 
as desalination) is introduced in year 2010, and (b) where imported water is used to augment 
capacity in years 2010 and thereafter. Instead of levelling off at this date, incremental 
consumption and associated production and environmental costs continue to increase up to the 
(arbitrary) cut-off date of 2015. Using as before an AIC formulation, the MOC associated with 
the backstop technology solution is estimated at $7.21 per cu in. From Table 1, MPC of 
production using existing conventional technology, is $2.50. MUC, which is defined as being 
the excess of the present worth of unit production cost using backstop technology over that with 
conventional technology, is therefore $2.71. Unit environmental costs are unaffected by the 
source of water, and remain at $2.00 per cu in. 
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For purposes of illustration, this example assumes that the country concerned is one that finds it 
feasible to import water from abroad. Importing water as an alternative to the use of expensive 
backstop technology in this case appears in fact to be slightly cheaper, the MOC as of 1994 
being estimated at $7.13 per cu m. It will be observed that in this case water, whether imported 
or produced by desalination, may be regarded as a homogeneous commodity. The estimates are 
unaffected whether the additional costs of the backstop technology or of imports are defined as 
part of MPC or whether they are labelled MUC. 
Note that for convenience a cut-off point for the calculation is at year 2015. While the import 
alternative appears to be cost-effective when 1994 is used as the base year, this may change over 
time, and re-calculation should be carried out year by year to ensure that changes in relative 
prices (including discount rates) are taken into account. In particular, the viability of the 
backstop technology compared with imports will also depend upon the useful length of life of 
the desalination plant, the estimates in this example being cut off only 2 years after its 
commissioning in the year 2013. (While evidently unrealistic, this assumption is relatively 
unimportant given the effect of the discounting procedure. However, the estimated useful life 
becomes not only more realistic when the calculation is done for succeeding years - the 25 year 
time horizon being maintained - but also more significant). 
The results are also sensitive to different assumptions about discount rates, as shown for rates 
between 2% and 15% in Table 3. MOC under both the backstop technology and the import 
scenarios is higher than that for the conventional technology at all discount rates. In the 
example, the import option is more expensive than the backstop technology at a discount rate of 
2%, but cheaper at the higher rates. (As noted above, however, this might change over time, as 
the true relationships between the backstop technology and import alternatives are revealed in 
the cost streams). 
MEC is assumed to be proportional to water consumption, and is not affected by changes in 
discount rates. It will however be observed that the higher the discount rate, the higher is the 
MPC of the conventional technology program. In fact, this is the traditional pattern observed in 
cost-benefit analysis, where net project costs in the early years are followed by net benefits, 
where higher discount rates reduce the present worth of net benefits. However, the reverse 
applies when either the backstop technology or the import alternative are incorporated into the 
production cost stream. In these cases, production costs increase at a faster rate than actual 
consumption when conventional sources become depleted; where this is so, a higher discount 
rate tends to reduce the MPC. This illustrates the generic principle that the magnitude of the 
MUC is inversely related to the discount rate, this being shown in the table to fall from $3.03 to 
$1.63 per cu in. as the discount rate increases from 2% to 15% Although not shown in the table, 
it is intuitively clear that extending the time horizon before the backstop technology or imports 
are required will also lower the MUC. 
Data requirements for the MOC calculation are clearly demanding. Most of the basic 
consumption and engineering data should be available from feasibility studies in the case of well 
run utilities. Adaptation of engineering cost data to reflect economic costs will require national 
level parameters for shadow prices which should be available from national planning agencies. 
Adjustment to reflect local or sector specific conditions with regard to costs and consumption 
will typically require original research. Where existing studies provide inadequate cost data, 
perhaps because certain technical alternatives have not been considered, efforts should be made 
to obtain the best judgement from engineers experienced in cost estimation. In general, 
experience in doing this kind of work often is valuable in indicating to those ultimately 
responsible for water supply the kind of information that an efficient organization should have, 
but often does not. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION 
Having estimated MOC, the next question is how to implement a price policy based upon this 
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concept. In principle, the steps to be followed in using MOC to bring about an optimal rate of 
system expansion are as follows: 
(a) Estimate future water "requirements" over a 20-25 year period, in light 
of planned industrial investment, population growth and income and 
price elasticities, and other specific variables such as the presence of 
sewerage. 
(b) Design the least cost program for meeting the foregoing requirements. 
(i.e. investment and operating costs of production plus external costs 
plus user costs discounted to a present worth, where all costs are 
defined in economic rather than in financial terms). 
(c) Set price equal to MOC (based upon (b), and using the AIC 
methodology). 
(d) Observe the reaction of consumers to the price change, i.e. re-estimate 
water requirements (as in step (a)). 
(e) Re-estimate the least cost program for the new water requirements (as 
in step (b)). 
(f) Re-estimate MOC, and continue the above procedure by a series of 
iterations until an equilibrium is achieved. 
The foregoing may be incorporated into a predictive model which will, in effect, iterate between 
various estimates of MOC, water demand, and least cost solutions, to arrive at an equilibrium 
solution. In practice, however, there are a number of obstacles to the straightforward application 
of MOC pricing for water supply. These include: inadequate data on demand elasticities; the 
presence of externalities; the metering problem; a variety of financial and fiscal issues; 
providing service to the poor; and shadow pricing and second best considerations. 
Price Elasticities 
A number of studies provide general evidence that price elasticity of demand is sufficiently high 
to make the topic of water pricing an important one from an efficiency standpoint, i.e. that 
raising price from current low levels to one based upon marginal cost will in fact result in 
substantial net savings. A World Bank/Overseas Development Institute study reports that in a 
number of developed countries - Israel, Canada, United States, Australia and Great Britain - 
empirical analysis has shown that the price elasticity of demand for water by households is 
between -0.3 and -0.7, (i.e. a doubling of the price of water would reduce consumption by 
between 30 and 70 percent). A similar range of elasticities is reported from studies of a number 
of developing countries in Asia and Latin America. There is also much empirical evidence about 
the potential substitution of capital for water in industry. For example, substantial increases in 
industrial water prices in Japan in the mid 1970's stimulated major investments in recycling, and 
sharp reductions in consumptive water use. 
Such general evidence is of course no substitute for empirical analysis of specific water systems 
in developing countries, since a host of variables may be very location-specific. These include 
type and quality of housing, per capita income and its distribution, the structure of industry and 
commerce, the means of wastewater disposal, as well as the costs of incremental supplies. Note 
also that statistical analysis based upon cross-sectional or time series analysis may often be 
frustrated by data problems, including measurement of actual water consumption, with system 
losses (often as much as 50% of total production) and non-existent or inadequate metering of 
individual premises also contributing to the problem. Water shortages, often associated with low 
prices, may also be a major determinant of actual consumption, and the identification problem is 
frequently encountered. Moreover, while short term price elasticities may be identifiable, this 
may not be relevant for investment planning. As consumers adapt to price changes, it can be 
expected that demand will become more elastic; but long term elasticities are also difficult to 
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estimate since price effects are often swamped by the influence of other variables. Nevertheless, 
the potential gains from refining knowledge of demand determinants suggests that empirical 
work in this area, perhaps involving production function analysis for large water users, would be 
useful. 
Externalities 
The observed willingness of consumers to pay for water or sewage facilities may be an 
inadequate indicator of social value where externalities are associated with such services. Thus, 
an external benefit that might result from the consumption of potable water by X is that the 
health of his neighbour Y might improve as a consequence. Since X would not take the health of 
Y into account in his decision to consume potable water, his willingness to pay would tend to 
understate the benefits that would accrue to the community as a whole. MEC in this case would 
be negative. (Note that whether related to direct or external benefits, a normative judgement 
based upon the evidence of willingness to pay has to assume that the consumer is well informed 
about epidemiological relationships; clearly, such an assumption is often unjustified). 
The externality problem with regard to sewerage is particularly complicated. In viewing it, it is 
important to distinguish between sewage collection on the one hand and sewage treatment and 
disposal on the other. The benefits of connection to a sewerage system are fairly direct, and 
willingness to pay can be identified. On the other hand, the benefits arising from actual sewage 
treatment may be several miles from the properties that are connected to the sewers, so 
willingness to pay by actual waste dischargers is unlikely to express social benefits adequately. 
Independent valuation of such benefits is thus required; health impacts are likely to be the 
dominant benefit in the case of sewage collection and disposal, along with aesthetic, 
recreational, or savings in water production costs. The health impact of improved sewerage 
facilities will tend to be greater in more densely populated urban areas because of the lack of 
unpolluted water supply and the greater chance of contagion. On grounds of externalities, where 
consumers are unaware of the advantages of clean water and improved sanitation in improving 
health, this may point to a policy of consumer education, combined, as an interim measure, with 
subsidization of basic sanitation facilities in such areas, and this of course is often done. 
A perennial issue concerns the appropriate way to charge for water supply and sewerage in cities 
in which some areas are served with water supply only while others have both water and 
sewerage. The most common means of dealing with this situation, where water and sewerage 
systems are operated by the same authority, is to separate the costs of water supply and 
sewerage, and to levy a sewerage surcharge only for those households actually connected to the 
sewerage system. Such a policy will often be suboptimal in terms of the criterion that price 
should equal incremental costs. For those already connected to the sewerage system, the 
incremental costs of waste disposal are relatively low, since the main element of costs - i.e. the 
sewers themselves - are "sunk". It can be expected, as long as the original decision to invest in 
sewerage was economically justified, that the MEC of disposing of wastewater by some 
consumers currently without sewerage will exceed the MPC of those who are connected. 
Theoretically, therefore, there may be a case for levying a higher metered water charge for 
persons without sewerage facilities than for those who are connected to the system. The 
social/political obstacles to such a policy are apparent, but the general rationale is sometimes 
used to justify some contribution to sewerage costs from those who do not directly receive this 
service. 
While there are theoretical advantages of basing charges or taxes on the economic costs of 
discharging wastewater and pollutants into the sewer system, administrative feasibility and the 
cost of the necessary monitoring suggests that a charge for wastewater disposal based upon 
metered water consumption will, in practice, have to be a fairly blunt instrument. As noted 
above, when applied to water supply, marginal cost pricing is a viable means of achieving 
efficient resource allocation, in the sense of ensuring that the benefits of system expansion 
exceed the costs. If price is set equal to marginal cost, and consumers demonstrate their 
willingness to pay such a price, it means that they place a value on the marginal unit consumed 
13 of 21 2003-01-22 2:18 PM 
Marginal Opportunity Cost Pricing for Municipal Water Supply http://idrinfo.idre.ca/archive/corpdocs/118129/Marginal.htm 
at least as great as the cost to the rest of society of producing that unit; output and consumption 
should therefore be expanded when system capacity is reached. If, on the other hand, the market 
clearing price is less than marginal cost, it can be assumed that there is oversupply; the cost of 
additional output exceeds the benefits. 
Application of this principle to the disposal of wastewater (the cost of sewerage and sewage 
treatment) presents a number of difficulties. It is obvious that when - as is common - sewage 
collection and disposal is financed from general revenues in such a way that there is no 
relationship between payment and benefits, the source of finance cannot be used to impute 
willingness to pay. Moreover, if sewage collection and disposal are charged for on the basis of 
metered water consumption, a revealed willingness to pay a given price simply indicates a value 
placed upon incremental water consumption plus its disposal. It is not possible to determine the 
extent to which willingness to pay refers to water supply alone or to water supply plus its 
disposal through the sewerage system. Allocation of costs or revenues between water and 
sewerage by the utility is in practice purely a bookkeeping matter, and provides no guidance for 
resource allocation. Consequently, to place normative significance on willingness to pay for 
water supply plus sewerage implies the judgement that sewage collection and disposal facilities 
are a necessary accompaniment of investments in water supply. While a popular notion, this is 
usually based upon intuitive judgement, and avoids the fundamental question of how to justify 
the sewerage component alone. 
Placing a surcharge on water consumption which covers incremental sewerage costs does 
however have certain advantages from an economic standpoint. Although it does not assist in the 
sewerage investment decision, such a pricing policy is required if water and sewerage capacity is 
to be utilized most efficiently, and in particular that the least social cost means of disposing of 
wastewater is achieved. The water consumer is provided with an incentive to use the water 
supply and waste disposal facilities up to the point that the marginal private benefit equals the 
marginal system cost, and given the decision to invest in a particular means of wastewater 
disposal, optimality is achieved. This is a sufficient argument to justify charging for sewage 
disposal on the basis of metered water use. However, for it to be effective even in this limited 
sense requires that water consumers be categorized according to the type of waste they discharge 
into the system, and charged accordingly. In practice, this will be difficult to do; and even if 
such categories can be developed, a charge based upon water consumption (as opposed to one 
levied individually on actual discharges) is a blunt instrument that does not have - as an effluent 
charge would - the merits of distinguishing between users according to the quality of effluents 
actually discharged into the sewers. 
The discussion thus far is applicable only to those water users who are already connected to a 
sewer. The difficulty of determining willingness to pay for connection to any system by advance 
testing of the market is well known - sewerage being similar to water supply, electricity, and so 
in this regard. Analysis of experience in other similar situations is necessary in order that 
estimates of the willingness of potential beneficiaries to pay connection fees and other 
sewerage-specific charges can be made. In principle one could impute the value that a 
householder places upon the connection of his home to a sewerage system from his payment of 
(a) a connection charge, or (b) a tax, the magnitude of which is in part determined by his 
connection to a sewer and which could include the additional water charge he is likely to pay, 
This, however, requires that the householder has an option to connect or not to connect, and 
therefore to pay or not to pay for the service. If, as is often the case, connection of houses to a 
sewer placed under a particular street is compulsory for all houses on that street, freely 
expressed willingness to pay for sewerage is not revealed. Evidence of willingness to pay may 
also be obtained by expenditures on alternative means of wastewater disposal such as septic 
tanks, or on the basis of the impact of sewerage construction on land values. 
The Metering Decision 
A traditional obstacle to improved pricing for water supply and its disposal - and one which is 
highly relevant for pricing environmental services in general - is the measurement of the 
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quantity of water consumed and the quantity and quality of wastewater discharged. The 
introduction of metering, which in effect raises price at the margin from zero to some positive 
figure may be expected to reduce consumption, thereby deferring the need for capacity 
expansion, and saving in water system operating costs. However, the introduction of volumetric 
pricing may be more expensive than allowing water to be free at the margin. Whether or not to 
invest in a metering programme, for which class of consumer, and the optimal timing of such 
decisions is in fact a suitable subject for cost-benefit analysis. 
In principle, the decision should be based upon a comparison of the present worth of the costs of 
the metering program (i.e. installation, maintenance and replacement of meters, and meter 
reading and additional billing costs) with the present worth of the savings in production costs 
thereby achieved, plus the loss of consumer surplus resulting from reduced consumption. Where, 
as is normal, there is uncertainty about demand elasticity - the extent to which consumption will 
actually fall when metering is introduced - so-called "switching values" can be used. In this case, 
the percentage reduction in per capita consumption necessary to achieve savings sufficient to 
offset metering costs can be estimated, and a judgement then made as to its likelihood. Clearly, 
the higher the MOC of water consumption, and the lower the cost of metering, the more likely 
that metering will be justified. Typically therefore metering should be employed for large 
industrial users, where metering costs are low relative to consumption while it may not be 
justified for certain other categories, such as individual apartment dwellers, where metering 
costs are high, and per household water consumption low. If the switching value shows extreme 
values - e.g. unreasonably high or negligible reductions in per household consumption required 
to justify the introduction of volumetric pricing - it is easy to make a judgement as to whether or 
not metering is justified; if not, at least major errors in installing meters can be avoided. 
Considerable variations in the relevant variables exist both between and within countries, so 
there is much scope for this type of analysis. 
Where metering is not feasible, alternative financing methods have to be used. These may 
include charges based upon property value, or property size. In practice such methods often 
represent an uneasy compromise between ability to pay and fairness, with regard to the amount 
of water that is generally consumed by a particular consumer group. Considerable dissension 
often arises in determining equitable charging schemes for certain types of commercial activity. 
Some of these may consume small amounts of water, so metering may be unjustified; however, 
the property value proxy may result in excessive charges. 
Financial Viability and Economic Efficiency 
Marginal cost pricing results in financial losses to an enterprise when average costs are falling, 
that is, when marginal cost is less than average cost. This situation could be temporary, arising 
for example when there is excess capacity and price is equated to short run marginal cost. It 
might also be a situation of some permanence, even if there is perfect capital divisibility if long 
run average costs continued to decline and price is equated to long run marginal cost. If there is 
capital indivisibility, a price equal to AIC would in these circumstances also result in loss 
making. 
Failure to cover financial costs may have adverse consequences from a purely efficiency 
standpoint. First, the accounting losses have to be absorbed somehow, and it will often be 
difficult to achieve the necessary transfer of real income without creating distortions of 
consumer or producer's choice as severe as those encountered in deviating from marginal cost 
pricing. Second, the financial discipline and organizational autonomy resulting from financial 
viability are often thought to be the best way to ensure efficient operation of the undertaking 
concerned. 
Solutions to this dilemma have been proposed which have usually tried to obtain the best of both 
worlds: the resource allocation advantages of marginal cost pricing on the one hand and the 
achievement of satisfactory financial performance on the other. There are, in fact, many 
variations on a common theme, the simplest of which is a two-part tariff where a water 
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consumer would pay a sum per thousand gallons consumer equal to marginal cost, plus a lump 
sum covering non-marginal "sunk costs" and other costs unrelated to consumption. In this way, 
as long as liability to the lump sum payment does not deter anyone from consuming the system's 
water altogether, optimal allocation may be achieved. 
Similarly, efficient allocation may theoretically be achieved by the use of price discrimination 
based upon the estimated price elasticity of demand. Since prices above marginal cost reduce 
demand - and therefore output - below the optimum, output reductions are minimized if prices 
are marked up most where demand is most price inelastic, thereby minimizing the loss of 
economic efficiency. Although such omniscience is rare, this general approach, popularly known 
as charging "what the traffic will bear," is often employed to finance water supply; for example, 
larger residential and industrial consumers may be charged higher prices than smaller domestic 
consumers. Due to the difficulty of estimating demand elasticities the use of increasing block 
rates cannot be relied upon to ensure efficiency; and it should be emphasised that the presence of 
increasing marginal costs of supply system- wide does not justify the use of an increasing block 
rate tariff structure (the marginal cost per unit of water consumed by large users does not differ 
from that by small users). 
With regard to waterborne waste disposal, the kind of tariff that would tend to result from 
application of the above principles is likely to consist of two parts. Since the initial investment 
in sewerage (primarily sewage collection) is such an important element of costs, and one that 
may contain the capacity for as much as 25 years' load growth, the associated problems of 
"lumpiness" or capital indivisibility would normally imply the need for a large fixed charge, 
plus a relatively low commodity charge. The low commodity charge would be based upon water 
consumption (and therefore sewage flow), and would reflect incremental operating costs plus 
incremental capacity costs mainly of treatment and disposal works. 
Since externalities are so important in decisions to invest in sewage disposal facilities, there may 
often be conflict between financial aims of the appropriate utilities and resource allocation 
objectives. For financial reasons, sewerage authorities frequently have to ensure that high 
income residential areas - where the need for sewers (and perhaps piped water) is less because of 
lower population density and the presence of alternative means of disposal (septic tanks) - are 
served before congested low income areas, where from a general environmental view point, the 
need is greater. In such cases, the financial viability of the utility requires that individual 
willingness or ability to pay is given more weight in determining investment priorities than the 
external effects. Clearly, this may not be an economically efficient ordering of priorities, but due 
to financial constraints water and sanitation authorities frequently find themselves in such a 
position. 
Financial problems associated with marginal cost pricing are however considerably eased in 
most cases, the normal situation being one in which costs are rising sharply as sources of supply 
conveniently located to the point of consumption are exhausted, and sources further and further 
away must be exploited. Where long run average costs are rising, i.e. marginal cost is in excess 
of average cost, AIC pricing would typically generate financial surpluses. The question of 
disposing of these surpluses would then arise. A problem associated with the generation of 
excessive revenues by an industry such as water supply which typically does not operate in a 
competitive situation is that there is inadequate control over the disposition of the revenues. 
Wasteful and inefficient operation of the enterprise may be encouraged. There may also be 
simply political arguments against letting water utilities generate excess profits; the excess 
profits resulting from MOC pricing might therefore be redistributed as a lump sum to consumers 
independently of their consumption levels, thereby still satisfying the efficiency criterion. 
Clearly, specially close regulation of water authorities, whether publicly or privately operated, 
would be required in these circumstances. 
One alternative would be to use the excess revenues to defray other public expenditures and/or 
reduce taxes elsewhere. Taxes levied on water consumption could be an efficient means of 
raising public revenues, satisfying various taxation criteria, i.e. contributing to economic 
16 of 21 2003-01-22 2:18 PM 
Marginal Opportunity Cost Pricing for Municipal Water Supply http://idrinfo.idre.ca/archive/corpdocs/l 18129/Marginal.htm 
efficiency goals, being administratively straightforward, and amenable to adjustment for income 
distributional purposes. Analogous to the case sometimes made for "green taxes"'in general, a 
fiscally neutral approach could, if desired, be employed. While in practice the primary objective 
in most developing country situation is still to increase water prices so that at least financial 
subsidisation is avoided, it is important to highlight the potential fiscal contribution that can be 
made - at the municipal or national levels - by MOC pricing. 
Supplying the Poor 
Resistance to price increases for water is often based on the argument that the poor must have 
access to supplies sufficient to meet their basic health needs. The real economic cost of water is 
usually a very small fraction of household disposable income, and this argument rarely has 
merit; indeed, there is much evidence to demonstrate the willingness of poor people to pay 
private water vendors much higher prices for lower quality water than that supplied through 
municipal systems. Moreover, if prices fail to reflect supply costs, expansion of systems to meet 
growing demands may not be financially feasible. Nevertheless, social or political reasons may 
require that pricing of water for smaller consumers should be subsidized. There may also be 
conventional economic reasons: the presence of external health benefits, combined with lack of 
consumer understanding of health impacts, may also justify subsidization. In general, these 
considerations might be expected to be more prevalent among low income than among high 
income consumers. 
Subsidization of basic water requirements should rarely pose a serious financial problem for the 
utility concerned. Typically the bulk of the consumption is by a relatively small number of 
consumers (large residential, commercial and industrial users). Economic (marginal) costs of 
water supply are rising virtually everywhere. Marginal costs are thus by definition in excess of 
average financial costs incurred by water utilities. MOC pricing for all water consumed over and 
above the relatively small quantity identified as required to meet basic health needs would 
therefore typically generate sufficient revenues for the utility to operate, and indeed to permit 
expansion of supply to areas as yet unserved, thereby being directly beneficial to lower income 
groups. 
In practice, a commonly observed approach in developing countries is to make use of a tariff 
schedule that consists of two steps - a low subsidized "lifeline" rate for the first 6 to 8 cubic 
meters per month and a higher rate for all additional consumption. If the second step is equated 
to marginal cost, it may result in an acceptable tradeoff between economic efficiency on the one 
hand and equity on the other. In practice, such a policy will obviously require special 
arrangements for cases such as the occupancy of large (single metered) apartment buildings 
occupied by many low income families; or bulk purchases by private water vendors whose 
customers are poor. 
More complex tariff schedules with multiple increasing blocks or with blocks which are 
intended to increase approximately in proportion to the recorded income distribution of the 
country are also relatively common in developing countries. However, while they may often be 
the best that can be achieved in a political sense, they are not an entirely satisfactory solution. In 
many developing countries households with house connections represent a relatively wealthy 
segment of the population, and there is no good reason for pricing any portion of their 
consumption at less than marginal cost. There are also many influences on water consumption 
other than income, a reliable correlation between water consumption and household per capita 
income being particularly difficult to establish. If governments wish to redistribute income there 
are many more efficient ways to do it than through water supply tariffs. Given that since most 
water is consumed by a relatively small number of consumers a marginal cost-based price for all 
consumption over that required for basic health purposes would generally be an efficient, 
equitable, and financially viable policy. 
Second-Best Issues and Shadow Pricing 
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Another difficulty encountered in applying marginal cost pricing to the provision of water 
supplies in known as the second-best problem. What may appear at first sight to be a step in the 
direction of economic efficiency (for example setting a price equal to marginal cost, or indeed, 
of introducing a pricing mechanism where none hitherto existed) may not be an improvement at 
all should inefficient conditions prevail in other sectors of the economy. Optimality in any one 
sector might require a price greater or less than marginal cost to counter such inefficiencies. 
In practice, in any economy in which there is a reasonable degree of competition, it has to be 
assumed that elsewhere goods and services are sold at prices that in general approximate their 
marginal costs. If not, the difficulties of adjusting for all imperfections may lead to the 
conclusion that there are, after all, no empirical grounds for preferring any one set of pricing 
rules over any other. Where, however, goods or services that are in direct competition with (or 
are complementary to) the services in question are priced in a way that diverges sharply from the 
standard set for the water supply or sewage disposal system it may be possible to make the 
necessary adjustments. As noted earlier, if prices of resources employed in constructing and 
operating water supplies diverge from their marginal cost to society, shadow prices should 
ideally placed upon them in evaluating the real cost to society of the expenditure. Labor that 
would otherwise be unemployed might be valued near zero (that is, at an estimate of its 
opportunity cost) even though, due to market imperfection, it is able to command a wage rate in 
excess of the minimum amount needed to attract it; foreign exchange costs should be valued at 
their market rate; interest rates should reflect the social opportunity cost of capital, and so on. 
Adjustments of this nature are necessary if the ultimate consumer is to be faced with a price for 
water that reflects the true economic cost which his consumption entails. 
However, such adjustments may not be sufficient. It may not be feasible (or economically 
efficient) to expect consumers to pay the full MOC for water if their own incomes do not 
adequately reflect social opportunity costs. This situation is clearly illustrated in economies that 
are undergoing radical restructuring, such as China. In fact, economic development in China is 
characterized by great unevenness; rapid liberalization in some parts of economy is not matched 
by equivalent changes in other parts. This is illustrated by the case of private abstraction of 
water by farmers. In the Beijing area, the bulk of the water consumed is privately abstracted by 
farmers and industry using private tubewells, such abstraction placing great pressure on 
dwindling groundwater sources, and necessitating the major investments in additional capacity 
referred to earlier. Private abstraction is virtually free of charge; raising price to MOC would 
doubtless reduce demand significantly, thereby enabling deferment of the water transfer scheme, 
and resulting in large net benefits. 
Such reform may however be frustrated by the fact that farmers may be unable to pay a price for 
water equal to its MOC where price controls exist on farm products, or where production quotas 
exist. Similarly, industrial enterprises may be precluded from operating efficiently by a variety 
of government price controls, limited access to credit and other restrictions. Apart from purely 
political obstacles, distortions elsewhere in the system are therefore serious constraints to policy 
reform in any sector such as water supply. Thus the need to subsidize farmers is part of a much 
wider problem regarding agriculture price reform. However, it is important for policy makers to 
be made aware of the true extent of the magnitude of the subsidy that is provided to farmers and 
industrialists through allowing them access to free water supplies, so that the merits of such 
subsidies can be explicitly considered. As interim measures during the period of economic 
transition, alternatives might include marginal cost pricing for water plus a cash subsidy 
unrelated to water use; or compensation for reduction or closure of farm or industrial operations 
when the social costs of such operations clearly exceed the social benefits. The general 
conclusion is therefore that distributional equity as well as efficiency and fiscal considerations 
suggest that improved pricing for water and other public services - or for degradation of the 
natural environment - must be introduced gradually, in accordance with overall trends in market 
reform. A long term strategy is thus required. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
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While there are a number of complications, there is clearly considerable scope for water pricing 
reform in most developing countries. While some will gain and others lose from such reform, 
measures can be taken to protect deserving cases. However, from a societal point of view, price 
reform can be expected to be a "win-win" policy, i.e. in which various objectives can be satisfied 
at once. MOC pricing clearly has a role to play, but as the preceding pages indicate, its actual 
implementation requires much research, primarily of an empirical nature. Some of these are 
listed below: 
(a) Identify the least social cost means of meeting projected water demand. The 
water supply and associated wastewater disposal program for a large 
metropolitan area might be selected for empirical study. Proposed 
engineering solutions could be evaluated, substituting economic for 
financial costs; alternative solutions, explicitly considering costs incurred, 
not simply by water authorities, but also by households, industry, and 
agriculture. The concept of opportunity cost, including the value of water in 
alternative uses, should be central to this analysis. External costs of water 
production and disposal) should also be explicitly considered. Note that in 
many cases, available engineering feasibility studies often relate to a fairly 
short time horizon, and are typically tied to preconceived engineering 
solutions. 
(b) Related to the above, analyze the obstacles to implementation of socially 
cost-effective solutions; why are low cost technologies not implemented? 
Obstacles include price distortions, i.e. a divergence between social costs 
and the costs faced by the decision maker; these may be due to general 
market distortions, requiring shadow pricing adjustments to be made, or 
may be specific to the investment in question. Local distortions in labor and 
land markets, administrative and social problems associated with labor 
intensive or community based approaches; social and cultural constraints of 
various kinds may all conspire to prevent the implementation of socially 
cost-effective measures. 
(c) Although MOC pricing is essentially used to place the burden of valuation 
upon the consumer, there is no escape from benefit measurement if the 
MUC and MEC components are to be evaluated. Moreover, knowledge of 
price elasticities, as noted above, will assist in system planning. There is 
considerable scope for applied research in this area. While a substantial 
body of experience exists, application and adaptation of standard 
methodologies to developing country situations is still required. Such 
research might include the following kinds of approaches: 
measurement of the impact on property values (water, sewerage and 
drainage), 
estimation of consumer surplus on the basis of expenditures that 
would otherwise be incurred on private means of waste disposal 
(septic tanks, etc.), 
. quantification of costs of travelling to existing water sources, 
. quantification of health benefits (water and sewerage), 
. estimation of consumer surplus from evidence of payments to water 
vendors, or planned investments in private sources of supply, 
. quantification of irrigation benefits (sewerage), 
. savings in costs of night soil collection (sewerage), 
. estimation of benefits for tourism and fishing (water and sewerage), 
. estimation of flood control benefits (sewerage), 
. contingent valuation approaches. 
(d) Econometric demand analysis, using cross-sectional and/or time series data. 
Empirical analysis would involve, inter alia, data on water consumption by 
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different income groups and types of industry. Relationships between water 
consumption and types of housing, quality of service, and means of 
wastewater disposal may also be assessed (e.g. inhabitants of single family 
dwellings can be expected to use more water than apartment dwellers; 
where water quality is inferior or shortages occur, supply considerations 
may dominate; water consumption is much lower for those relying upon 
public standposts or who are not served with adequate sewerage or other 
means of wastewater disposal. 
(e) Estimate and recommend an implementation strategy for MOC pricing for 
water and its disposal in an urban metropolitan or a rural area. This should 
involve a sequence of estimates: least social cost solution; MOC 
calculation, including the AIC approximation to long run marginal cost; and 
implementation issues, including metering, financial and fiscal matters, 
provision of service to the poor, etc. Individual components of this exercise 
may also be identified as separate research topics, some possibilities being 
listed in (f) to (j) below. 
(f) The metering decision. The importance of this topic is that it raises issues of 
a generic nature, and particularly relevant for environmental issues 
generally, in which problems may arise because the cost of ensuring and 
measuring exclusive use of a resource are very high. Such study should 
assess the costs and benefits of introducing water meters, the sensitivity to 
different assumptions about price and income demand elasticities as well as 
the costs of metering and the investment and operating costs of future water 
supplies. Consumers should be divided into groups, based upon the cost of 
metering and consumption levels, and the quality of wastewater discharged, 
and a determination made about the desirability of introducing metering - 
and its optimal timing - by consumer group. Where the costs of metering 
exceed the benefits, alternatives may be considered, and similarly subjected 
to cost-benefit analysis. This would be particularly important where 
metering is not feasible, and therefore where prices cannot be raised to 
ration capacity. In such cases water shortages have to be handled by 
physical rationing, which may take many forms, including cutting off 
supplies at certain hours. This may entail health and other costs; 
alternatively, flow control devices and design standards for water using 
appliances may be employed. Research should also consider alternative 
revenue raising methods in light of various criteria including efficiency; 
equity; and administrative feasibility. 
(g) Second-best issues. The introduction of efficient pricing for water may be 
affected by the presence of general distortions in the economic system. 
Research on a strategy for implementing MOC pricing could involve a 
careful analysis of the prices of goods and services that are complementary 
to or competitive with water. In practice, this might be most useful in an 
economy in a major stage of transition such as China, where for example 
price reform applied to farm consumption might be frustrated by distortions 
in the prices of farm outputs. 
(h) Pricing for wastewater disposal raises a series of researchable issues. 
Justification for investment in sewerage and sewage treatment should be 
based upon the MEC incurred if no such facilities exist. By case study, 
research should develop the criteria for extending sewerage facilities 
throughout a metropolitan area, and the appropriate charging system that 
should apply, both for those actually connected to the sewerage system as 
well as for those who are not. Such research should distinguish between 
dischargers of waste based upon the quality of their effluents and water 
pricing schedules developed accordingly. Since using water consumption as 
a basis for pricing is a rather blunt instrument, regulatory procedures are in 
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practice the principal control method. However, there remains much scope 
for applied research regarding the appropriate mix of pricing and regulatory 
methods. 
(i) Price variation according to time and location of consumption should also 
be analyzed. The case for seasonal peak load pricing in a number of 
different types of water resource systems, including those in which there are 
competing demands, i.e. for irrigation, hydroelectric power, or flood control 
systems should be assessed. More generally, the MOC of municipal water 
supply should be analyzed in terms of the opportunity cost in such 
alternative uses. The scope for varying price within a water utility's network 
may also warrant research. 
(j) Financial and fiscal issues. Analysis of the financial and fiscal implications 
of MOC pricing is an important research topic. Increasing costs of water 
supply suggest that the issue will often be how best to dispose of excess 
profits. In this analysis, the prospects of using the revenues to expand 
service to low income groups, possibly accompanied by a "lifeline rate" for 
small users should be assessed. Alternatively, the case for using water 
revenues as a source of general revenue, and the mechanisms necessary to 
achieve this, should be considered. While increasing long run marginal 
costs of water may indicate financial profitability, this may be more than 
offset when marginal waste disposal costs are included, particularly if large 
scale rehabilitation works are required. Research should also include design 
of tariff structures in such cases. 
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